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Reflections on the Rule of Law and
Foreign Investment in China
Leontine D. Chuang*
I. INTRODUCTION
For two decades after Chairman Mao Zedong declared the formation of
the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, China remained dor-
mant in the international economic arena. But in 1979, the sleeping giant
awoke when it voluntarily opened its doors to foreign investment and for-
eign trade by adopting an open door policy. Since that time, the Chinese
have taken off on a rocky road to build their economy and the legal struc-
tures around which their economy is to thrive. Though the road has been
bumpy, China's economy has grown by leaps and bounds since 1979.
From 1978 to 1993, its economy grew between US$2,000 and $4,000 per
"J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to
thank my parents for their support. I would also like to thank Warren G. Lavey of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Illinois) for helping me with selecting this topic, Douglas C.
MacLellan, William J. McMahon, and Jennifer Thompson for their comments and sugges-
tions, and China Online for providing up-to-date information on business and legal issues in
China.
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capita and in the early '90's its economic growth was unprecedented at 13%
a year.'
In 1979, the Chinese government enacted its first statute governing
foreign investment, entitled the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (hereinafter "JVL"). 2 Since then,
the Chinese government has continued to enact laws and regulations that
make up the legal framework governing foreign investment. One of the
most important laws enacted was the Foreign Economic Contract Law,
which governs all contracts with foreign parties (hereinafter "FECL").3
Even though almost 20 years have passed since the adoption of the first
foreign investment law in China, the legal framework governing foreign in-
vestment still remains unfinished and often misleading for foreign inves-
tors. This is unfortunate because not only does China have an unidentified
quantity of untapped resources, but it also has a population of 1.1 billion
people, comprising an attractive market where untold profits lay waiting.4
The lack of clarity in China's investment laws has translated into an
investment environment that is often uncertain, risky, and mired in red tape.
In fact, there have been cases where foreign corporations have invested in
joint ventures following what they thought to be all the requisite guidelines,
only to find out after the money had exchanged hands that something was
terribly wrong with the entire agreement. A perfect example of this is the
birth, development, and eventual demise of the ill-fated China-China-
Foreign (hereinafter "CCF") investment vehicles used for investment in
China's telecommunications industry in the past few years. This comment
will use CCF investment in China's telecommunications industry as a case
study to show how the vague legal framework for foreign investment in
China can make investment in China an unpredictable venture. It will also
discuss how a weak rule of law has contributed to developing this vague le-
gal framework through promoting the existence of multiple interpretations
1 See Neil Boyden Tanner, The Yin and Yang of Foreign Economic Contract Law in The
People's Republic of China-A Legalistic and Realistic Perspective, 16 J.L. & COM. 155
(1996); Gary J. Demelle, Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 6 DEPAuL BUs. L.J. 331, 333 n.13 (1994).2See John Zhengdong Huang, An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 471, 472 (1995). The JVL was adopted at
the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, and revised at
the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4, 1990. See Access
China, Law of the People's Republic of China: Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law (Apr. 4,
1990) (visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.accesschina.com/sinoeq.htm>.
3 See Huang, supra note 2, at 472; China: Foreign Economic Contract Law, translated in
24 I.L.M. 797 (1995). The Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China was adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People's Congress on March 21, 1985. See Mark C. Lewis, Contract Law in the People's
Republic of China-Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law be Ad-
ministered According to the Rule ofLaw?, 30 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L 495, 508 (1997).4See Demelle, supra note 1, at 332.
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of each law. Furthermore, this comment will reflect on the impact of the
U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement (hereinafter "U.S.-China WTO
Agreement"), signed in November 1999, and China's impending accession
into the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") on the case study.
It will also touch upon the possible ramifluations that entry into the WTO
will have on the rule of law in China.
China has an unlimited potential to grow. Foreigners who invest in
China, however, face many difficult hurdles and will often face tremendous
setbacks. Therefore, it is vitally important for foreigners to understand the
risks involved in investing in China and to be aware of the potholes created
by the weak legal framework.
At the end of the day, investors will weigh the costs and benefits of
doing business in China. For the past 20 years, most people have felt that
the benefits outweigh the costs. For the benefits to continue to outweigh
the costs, however, China must take steps to further develop the legal as-
pects of its foreign investment framework in all sectors of the economy and
to develop a stronger rule of law. Many people hope that China's impend-
ing accession into the WTO will be the catalyst that will not only push
China to provide more clarity to its legal investment framework, but will
also drive China to strengthen its rule of law. Some tremendous changes,
however, need to be made in order for this to happen. Though the Chinese
leadership has signaled, by signing the U.S.-China WTO Agreement, that it
is willing to make these changes in exchange for the ability to reinvigorate
its economy and to secure its position as a world leader, these changes will
not come easily, nor will they come quickly.
II. HISTORY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Between 1949 and 1979, China shielded its economy from the outside
world. During this period, the rule of law and formal legal institutions that
had been in place prior to the Communist takeover were largely disman-
tled.5 Furthermore, up until the late '70's, the communist-socialist system
that was put in place in 1949 did its best to cast negative light upon West-
erners.
6
With the opening up of the economy, not only did China have to take
steps to create an environment for foreign investment, but it had to take
steps to prove to foreign investors that it did not view them negatively any-
more. One of the first steps that it took was to enact the JVL. The JVL's
main premise was to permit foreign companies to join Chinese companies
in establishing joint ventures, approved by the Chinese government, that
5See Michael J. Moser, Introduction to FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE
LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-2 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987).6See Daniel J. Brink & Xiao Lin Li, A Legal And Practical Overview of Direct Invest-
ment and Joint Ventures in the "New" China, 28 J. MARSHALL L.REv. 567, 569 (1995).
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were in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit.
7
Through specifically listing the main industries in which foreign direct in-
vestment was permitted, the JVL implicitly stated that China did not plan to
open its entire economy up for foreign investment.8 The second major law
that was enacted in an effort to create an investment environment where in-
vestors would feel comfortable was the FECL.9 The FECL covered all eco-
nomic contracts between Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises. 10
In addition to enacting foreign investment laws, China also amended
its Constitution in 1982 to explicitly protect foreign investors' "lawful
rights and interests in the People's Republic of China."'" These legal en-
actments only represent a small number of changes that have taken place in
the past 20 years in an effort to build up a legal environment for foreign in-
vestment. To this day, however, the legal framework for foreign invest-
ment is still not fully constructed. There are still some sectors of the
Chinese economy that are not governed by any formal laws.
Another step that China took to build its legal framework for foreign
investment was to create the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation (hereinafter "MOFTEC"). MOFTEC was created as a functional
department under the State Council and is in charge of the administration of
China's foreign trade and economic cooperation.'2  MOFTEC's principal
duties are to form strategic plans; to formulate policies, laws, and regula-
tions; and to coordinate all foreign trade, foreign investment and economic
development. 13 Its tasks also include inspecting and approving relevant for-
eign investment laws, regulations, and contracts involving foreign funded
enterprises. 14 One of the regulations that MOFTEC has formulated is the
Catalogue For The Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (hereinafter
"Catalogue"). 15 In the past, the Catalogue has been a very important guide
for all foreign investors because it lists the industries in which foreign in-
vestment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited.' 6 With China's impend-
7See Access China, supra note 2.
8Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of The People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, translated in 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983).
9See Lewis, supra note 3, at 508.
'
0 See id.
"See Brink & Xiao, supra note 6, at 569.
12 See China Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, About MOFTEC (vis-




15See China Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (visited June 20, 1995) <http://www.moftec.gov.
cn/moftec/html/laws and regulations/investment25.html> [hereinafter "Catalogue"].
16See id.
Investing in China's Telecommunications Market
20:509 (2000)
ing accession into the WTO, the Catalogue, if not revised, will become ob-
solete as it would be superceded by the WTO agreements.
China has also developed five main business structures for foreign in-
vestment.17 They are the equity joint venture, contractual joint venture,
wholly owned foreign enterprise, the limited liability company, and the
joint stock limited company. 8 The typical joint venture structure involves
one foreign party and one Chinese party both injecting a certain amount of
capital into the joint venture. 9 As its equity share of the joint venture, the
foreign partner generally provides the technology, management expertise,
and capital.20 The Chinese partner usually provides the factory site, indus-
trial equipment, and other facilities.2' Earnings from the joint venture are
used to purchase materials, to pay salaries and wages, and are also distrib-
uted to the partners as dividends from the venture.
22
On the whole, foreign companies have not been shy to invest in China
in the past 20 years. Between 1979 and 1998, foreign companies have in-
vested an estimated US$268 billion in China.23 It appears, however, that
since 1993 the amount of foreign direct investment in China has been de-
creasing.24 In fact, the amount of foreign investment has dropped 7% in
1999 alone.25 The decrease in foreign investment can be attributed to the
fact that companies are losing money in their foreign investment ventures,
foreign investors are tired of the bureaucratic red tape and regulatory has-
sles involved in investing in China, and China's economic growth has
17See Brink & Xiao, supra note 6, at 568.
t8See id. This article will only discuss joint ventures and not wholly-owned foreign en-
terprises, limited liability companies, or joint stock limited companies.
19 See PHILLIP DONALD GRUB & JIAN HAl LiN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
CHINA 68 (1991).20Seeid. As this is only a description of a typical joint venture, variations may exist.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 69.
23The US $268 billion is the actual amount that was utilized. The amount contracted for
is US $571 billion. See The United States-China Business Council, Foreign and US Direct
Investment in China 1979-98 (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.uschina.org/press/ invest-
march99.html>.24See id. In the first six months of 1999, 8,052 foreign investment projects had been ap-
proved by MOFTEC; in 1998, 19,846 foreign investment projects were approved; and in
1997, 21,046 foreign investment projects were approved. See China Ministry of Foreign
Trade & Economic Cooperation, Statistics Data (visited Sept. 13, 2000), <http:/wwwv.
moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/html/statisticsdata/e99-01-06d.htm.>; see also China Minis-
try of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, Statistics Data (visited Sept. 13, 2000)
<http:/www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/htmllstatistics_datale98-01-12d.htm>.
25See China-Signs of Weakening in Foreign Investor Confidence, Telenews Asia, July 1,
1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business & Industry Database.
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slowed in the past few years.26 In addition, the shifting regulatory environ-
ment is wearing out an increasing number of investors.2 This has been
evidenced by the increasing number of foreign investors pulling out of
China because of the failure of their joint ventures.28
From January to May 2000, China's actual foreign investment totaled
only US$12.8 billion, a decrease of 12% from the same period in 1999.29
Contracted investment was on the rise, however, totaling US$18.2 billion, a
25% increase over the same period in 1999.30 Whether the actual money
flowing into China will match up with the contracted investment dollar fig-
ure still remains to be seen.
Though the problems involving loss of revenues from China's eco-
nomic slow-down is linked to the health of Asian economies as a whole, the
problems of a constantly shifting regulatory environment and bureaucratic
red tape are separate matters that can be solved by the government when-
ever it decides that it is time for reform. Foreign investors count on a
strong legal framework to support and protect their investments. Even
though China has tried to set up an environment that is friendly towards
foreign investment, it appears that the unpredictability of China's regulatory
environment, caused by its weak legal framework, is doing exactly the op-
posite. China's impending accession to the WTO, however, may be a
catalyst for change that will create a more protective environment for for-
eign investors.
III. CHINA'S IMPENDING ACCESSION INTO THE WTO
On November 15, 1999 China and the United States signed an agree-
ment that would pave the way for China to enter the WTO.31  This deal
26See Craig S. Smith, Multinationals Rethink Chinese Joint Ventures --- Red Tape and
Red Ledgers Spur Some to Pull Out: Others Hold Out Hope, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1999, at
A18.27See id.28In 1995, DaimlerChrysler AG's Freightliner subsidiary was approached by a Chinese
company with a proposal to set up a joint venture to build trucks for China's container trans-
port and construction industry. The Chinese company said that it would provide land and an
unused business license. A third partner claimed to have connections needed to secure gov-
ernment approval. Freightliner agreed, set up an office in Shanghai, and began paying the
$30 million it agreed to invest in the project when all of a sudden, it realized that there was
no way that the government would approve the project. The government said that they
weren't in compliance with China's auto policy. Now, Freightliner is trying to negotiate the
venture's liquidation, something that also needs government approval. See id.29See Money Mirage: Foreign Investment Floods China, But Where's the Liquid?
(visited June 20, 2000), <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/econnewslcurrentnewssecure
/c00061901.asp>.
30See id.
31See The Real Leap Forward, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 25. This agreement was
adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives on May 24, 2000, by the U.S. Senate on Sep-
tember 19, 2000 and signed into law by U.S. President Bill Clinton on Oct. 10, 2000. See
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holds tremendous significance for foreign investors in China because it is
an important step towards China's accession into the WTO. China's even-
tual accession into the global trading body will not only promote increased
trade activity with China through providing greater access to China's mar-
kets, but will also potentially give foreign investors greater protection for
their investments.
The U.S.-China WTO Agreement was the culmination of 13 years of
negotiations between the U.S. and China.32 The conclusion of these bilat-
eral talks, however, is only one of many steps towards formal accession into
the WTO. China must also hold bilateral talks with other WTO members
and sign similar trade agreements with them before they can formally join
the global trade body. 3 After agreements have been signed with other
WTO member governments, the WTO's Working Party on Chinese Acces-
sion must agree on a technical protocol for China's entry and create the le-
gal framework for its entry.34 All the bilateral agreements will be combined
into a multilateral one that paves the way for China's accession.35  The
multilateral discussions within the WTO framework may not be the last
step. Before China can accede, it will also have to amend its laws to com-
ply with its WTO commitments and the WTO has to assess whether China
has complied with the trade body's rules in different areas.36
Since China and the U.S. signed their WTO agreement, other WTO
members have followed the United States' lead and have completed deals
with China. On May 19, 2000 China and the EU reached a market access
agreement that removed another major barrier to China's fourteen-year ef-
fort to join the WTO.37 As of October 13, 2000, all but one of the 137
members of the WTO, Mexico, had concluded bilateral agreements with
China.38
In June 2000, China's chief negotiator on entry to the WTO and WTO
officials began drafting China's protocol of accession, which will serve as
the document that combines all the agreements China has signed with indi-
vidual WTO countries. 39 China's chief negotiator told reporters that an ac-
Urgent: Clinton Signs Bill on PNTR with China, Xinhua General News Service, October 10,
2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.32 See The Real Leap Forward, supra note 31.
33See The Remaining Hurdles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 26.34See WTO's Moore Praises U.S.-China Deal, But Says Entry Not Likely Soon (visited
Nov. 15, 1999) <http://vwv.chinaonline.corn/issues/wto/newsarchive/secure/l1999/novemb
eric9l1523.asp>.35See The Remaining Hurdles, supra note 33.
36 See id.37See Paul Mooney, China-EUReach WTO Deal (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.ch
inaonline.com/issues/vto/newsarchive/secure/2000/may/c00051924.asp>.38See Winds of Change Blowing; The Biggest Milestone Since 1978, S. China Morning
Post, Oct. 13, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nevs Group File.39See id.
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tion plan would be formulated detailing how China would tackle amending
or deleting some of its laws and practices affecting international trade to
make sure that they comply with WTO rules.40 Some of China's old laws
would be deleted as soon as China becomes a member of the WTO, while
others would be phased out over a set period of time.'"
One of the most important provisions of the U.S.-China WTO Agree-
ment is the provision allowing foreign companies to invest in China's tele-
communications market and Internet industry. This part of the agreement is
directly contrary to MOFTEC's Catalogue, which has long prohibited for-
eign investment in China's telecommunications industry4 because of na-
tional security concerns. The U.S.-China WTO Agreement states that
foreign companies may own as much as 49% in Chinese telecommunica-
tions ventures upon China's entry into the WTO and up to 50% in the sec-
ond year.43 As WTO rules state that countries in the body or joining it rihust
have extended the same level of market access to all other members, other
WTO members will have the same level of access to China's telecommuni-
cations market.44
Once China accedes to the WTO they are bound by the rules and
regulations of the organization and are also bound to participate in the WTO
dispute resolution process if trade or investment conflicts arise. This may
help decrease the investment risks caused by China's unpredictable regula-
tory environment, weak rule of law, and bureaucratic red tape. The main
question, though, is whether or not the Chinese government will make ac-
tual changes to embrace these new rules.
IV. THE UNICOM CASE
The failure of China United Telecommunications Corporation's (here-
inafter "Unicom") CCF foreign investment ventures with foreign investors
is a perfect illustration of the risks created by China's shifting regulatory
environment and its weak legal framework.
Prior to 1994, China's telecommunications industry was a monopoly
market dominated by the state run China Telecom (hereinafter "CT"). 4 In
1994, in an effort to liberalize China's telecommunications market, Unicorn
40 See id.
41 See id.42Catalogue, supra note 15.
41See Big Business Seeks Benefits Amid Details of China Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
1999, at A19.
'See Robert Evans, China Sees 'Final Stage' of Bid to Join WTO (visited August 13,
2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/currentnews/secureCO0051924.asp>.
'5See Douglas C. MacLellan, The China Telecommunications Industry and Implications
for Strategic Private Equity Investment 2 (Dec. 29, 1998) (unpublished paper for The
MacLellan Group, Inc.) (on file with author).
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was created to break CT's monopoly on domestic wireline and cellular te-
lephony."
The telecommunications industry in China is heavily regulated by the
government. 47 Regulations for the telecommunications industry are issued
and implemented by China's State Council and the Ministry of Information
Industry (hereinafter "M").48 Though there are currently no laws regulat-
ing this industry, a telecommunications law is in the process of being
drafted.49 It will define the government's role in the industry, allow de-
regulation of tariffs, outline rules for new entrants, and foster orderly com-
petition.50 This law will be the first comprehensive telecommunications
law in China and serve as the principal legal framework for telecommuni-
cations regulation.5 1 According to the MII, the drafting of this law will be
completed later on this year, but the legislative process could take much
longer.5 Legal analysts say that the law will standardize the regulatory
framework for the nation's telecommunications industry.53
China's telecommunications industry, as it relates to foreign invest-
ment, is also governed by regulations set by MOFTEC. Section VII, Part 1
of the Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries Chapter of the Catalogue
expressly prohibits foreign investment in the management of the telecom-
munications business.54 When China accedes to the WTO, the Catalogue's
prohibition will be superceded by the WTO agreements opening the tele-
communications industry to foreign investment. The industry will continue
to be governed by regulations set forth by the MU and MOFTEC.
Unicom has extensive political relationships with various ministries in
the government. Three government ministries, the former Ministry of
Electronic Industry (hereinafter "MEil"; MEI is now a part of M), the for-
mer Ministry of Power Industry (hereinafter "MOP"), and the Ministry of
Railways (hereinafter "MOR"), are significant shareholders of Unicom. 6
When Unicom was formed, however, it was undercapitalized and lacked the
4 6See id.
47See id.48See id.
49 See id. Wu Jichuan, the head of MII, has announced that a formal law will soon be
passed that will govern the telecomcommunications sector. See China Online, China's Tele-
cont Law To Be Promulgated "Soon" (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.com/i
ndustry/telecomcurrentnews/secure/c9105.asp>.
50See Christine Chan, Unicorn Document Reveals New Law's Intent, S. China Morning
Post, May 18, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.5 1 See id.
52See id.
53See id.
54See Catalogue, supra note 15.
55See MacLellan, supra note 45, at 2-3.56See id.
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financial resources it needed to compete with CT, which was the undisputed
the state giant.
As a result, in 1994, Unicom started to use a special financial scheme
to finance its telecommunications network buildout.5 7  This financial
scheme was known as China-China-Foreign or Zhong-Zhong-Wai or simply
CCF.58 The end result of the scheme was to have foreign investors provide
capital to finance Unicom projects in return for a share of revenues from
them.59 CCF was approved by the relevant government officials and be-
tween 1994 and 2000, 40 foreign companies invested around US$1.4 billion
into these telecommunications ventures operated by Unicorn. 60
To understand how these joint ventures fit through a legal loophole and
sidestepped the regulation banning foreign investment in the telecommuni-
cations sector, it is important to understand what the CCF investment
structure looked like. The CCF structure typically involved three parties.
A foreign investor first formed a joint venture with a Chinese partner that
was not prohibited from forming foreign joint ventures. 1 This joint venture
company would then sign various contracts and agreements with a Chinese
partner that was prohibited from forming foreign joint ventures.6 2 The for-
eign investor injected capital into the first joint venture company (formed
with the Chinese partner in the non-prohibited sector), which would then be
used to fund the projects with the second joint venture company (formed
with the Chinese partner in the prohibited sector).63 In return, the foreign
investor got a share of the revenues that were allocated to the joint ven-
57 See China Sets Limit on Unicom-Invented "Chinese-Chinese-Foreign" Investment
Model, Impact Hotly Debated at China Telecom 2000 Conference in New York, PR News-
wire, Oct. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business and Industry Data-
base; Telecommunications in China-Ban on Chinese-Chinese Foreign Projects, East Asian
Business Industry, Dec. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business and In-
dustry Database.
58 This scheme is not unique to the telecommunications industry.
5 9 See Mark O'Neill, Beiing May Scrap Unicom Foreign-Investment Formula, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT-BusINEss PosT, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.60See id.; Ministry Investigated for Overstepping Authority, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Sept. 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. These
companies include Sprint International, Wireless Electronique, Ltd. [hereinafter "WelCom"],
Daewoo, Bell Canada International, France Telecom, and Deutsche Telecom. See Letter
from Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman, Wireless Electronique, Ltd., to Bill Corbet United
States Trade Representative (Mar. 2, 1999) (on file with author); William J. McMahon,
South Korea's Daewoo Threatens to Sue China Unicom (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.chinaonline. com/topstories/c9090116.asp>. The funding raised from the
CCF ventures account for 72% of Unicom's funding. See PR Newswire, supra note 57.61 See PR Newswire, supra note 57.
62 See id.
63 See id.
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ture.64 Hence, the name CCF comes from the fact that there are two Chi-
nese parties and one foreign party involved.
In the Unicom case, "China Unicom Shareholder Companies" were
established to form China-based joint venture companies with foreign tele-
communications investors. 65 At the other end of the transaction, Unicom
set up provincial level operating companies, which were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Unicom having the right to construct and operate networks
within their geographic area, to work with the China-based joint venture
companies.66 The China-based joint venture company had no ownership in
the operating company, but had construction, financing, and services con-
tracts with the provincial level operating companies.67 The operating branch
level companies distributed net earnings to the joint ventures that con-
structed its network, which in turn distributed earnings to the shareholder
companies and the foreign investors.68 The joint venture and, hence, the
foreign investor had a right to sign ancillary contracts with the provincial
branches to maintain, service, and provide consulting services for the net-
work in return for a share of the revenues generated by the network.69
Using this investment scheme, the foreign investor did not have direct
foreign equity ownership in the network operating ventures nor did they
have direct ownership in the operation of the networks, two things that were
prohibited by the government.70 By taking the extra step and forming the
extra joint venture, the foreign investor had successfully removed itself,
theoretically, from directly engaging in business with Unicom.
Article 7, Chapter 2 of the FECL dictates that contracts are valid only
when they are approved by the Chinese government, if such approval is re-
quired by law or by administrative decrees.71 The law, however, does not
list all the different types of contracts that need approval.72 Contracts that
involve importing technology and engaging in joint ventures all require ap-
proval.7 Article 3 of the JVL states that "equity joint venture agreement[s],
contract[s] and article[s] of association signed by the parties to the venture
must be submitted to the relevant state department for examination and ap-
64See id.
65See MacLellan, supra note 45, at 4-6. This example is given in reference to the gen-
eral structure for most Unicorn CCF projects.
66 See id.67See id.68See id.69See id. at 5.
70 See id. at 4.
71 See China: Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 3.72See id.
73 See Zhang Yuqing & James S. McLean, China's Foreign Economic Contract Law: Its
Significance and Analysis, 8 J. INTL. L. Bus. 120, 130-34 (1987).
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proval." 74 Like other joint ventures, CCF joint ventures required govern-
mental approval, and CCF foreign investors were required to obtain busi-
ness licenses from relevant provincial authorities before commencing
operations.7s
Though the CCF contracts were either approved by MOFTEC, the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce, or local level officials76,
the foreign investors participating in the CCF schemes with Unicom could
not escape the venture's eventual demise. In October 1998, the Chinese
government, through the MI[, issued a statement stating that the CCF proj-
ect contracts executed between Unicom and foreign investment enterprises
were "irregular" under state policy and regulation. In August 1999, MII
officially asked Unicom to ban CCFs and to correct the situation.78  On
September 29, 1999, Unicom notified their CCF investors that they planned
to cease all cash flow distributions and compensation to their foreign part-
ners' joint venture companies as of October 1, 1999. 79 This notification
was seen as a formal declaration that Unicom was unilaterally rescinding all
of their CCF contracts.80
To resolve this issue, Unicom had to go through difficult negotiations
with their foreign partners to compensate them for the termination of the
CCF projects.8" In the beginning, the foreign investors had asked for more
compensation than Unicom was ready to give. Unicom was only willing
74See Access China, supra note 2. Chapter 2, Article 8 of the Regulations for Imple-
menting The Law on Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures also states that the establishment of a
joint venture in China is subject to the examination and approval of MOFTEC. See People's
Republic of China: Regulations for Implementing The Law on Chinese Foreign Joint Ven-
tures, translated in 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983).7 5See MacLellan, supra note 45, at 6.76See Opening China's Telecom Market: Process is Slow, Nontransparent, Piecemeal
and Often Frustrating, East Asian Executive Reports, Nov. 15, 1998, at 6, available in
WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
77See China: Telecoms Firm Told to Abandon Foreign-Funded, Joint Ventures, BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Feb. 4, 1999,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.7 8 See China-Telecom Service-No Foreign Fund, FT Asia Intelligence Service, Oct. 27,
1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus Anal. & Country Info, and Se-
lected Legal Texts and Codes.
7 9 See Douglas C. MacLellan, China Unicom Against the Foreign Telecom World 1 (Oct.
21, 1999) (unpublished paper for The MacLellan Group, Inc.) (on file with author).
"°See id.
81 See China-Telecom Minister Stresses Policies for Foreign Funds, FT Asia Intelligence
Wire, Sept. 19, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus Anal.& Country
Info, and Selected Legal Texts and Codes.
82See Telephone Interviews with Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman, WelCom (Sept. 27,
1999 & Oct. 14, 1999). The interviews lasted approximately 15-20 minutes each. Mr.
MacLellan gave the author some background regarding his knowledge of doing business in
China. He also explained the general Unicom situation, the specific situation surrounding
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to pay back the money that each foreign investor had already put into the
project, plus interest under terms set up by Chinese banks.83  They were
also willing to extend an invitation to the foreign investors to purchase
shares of Unicorn at the time of their initial public offering (hereinafter
"IfPO",).84 Unicorn had offered large foreign telecommunications partners
up to 15% of the total shares in the post-IPO Unicom. s Their [P0, which
was originally planned for the end of 1999, was delayed until June 2000
largely because of the CCF disputes.86
As the negotiations were difficult and took a long period of time, Uni-
com decided that any CCF projects not concluded by the time of the IPO
would not be included in the listed vehicle.8 7 However, they were able to
successfully negotiate settlements with all their CCF investors by their IPO
date, June 21, 2000, and as a result were able to transfer all their assets to
the vehicle that went public.8
Though the U.S.-China WTO Agreement opened up China's telecom-
munications market for foreign investment, the signing of the agreement
had minimal effect on the negotiations to end the CCF projects. A foreign
consultant involved in the negotiations stated that the agreement did not af-
fect the CCF deals at all.89 After the agreement was signed, an official of
WelCom's CCF contracts in China, and also expressed his personal opinions regarding the
situation.
S3See id.
84 See William J. McMahon, China Unicorn IPO Gains Momentum But Exit Strategy for
Foreign Firms Still Unclear, CHNAONLINE NEws, June 28, 1999 (on file with author); Mar-
tyn Williams, Newsbytes: Hong Kong, China, NEwvSBYTEs, Aug. 23, 1999 (on file with
author). The Chinese government has allowed its telecom companies, CT and Unicorn, to
list in foreign stock exchanges because this would help generate much needed capital.
Though this would allow foreign operators to buy into the firm, they would not have direct
involvement in its operation. See George Murray, Door Slammed on Foreign Involvement in
China Telecoms, Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, World News, Bus Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and Codes.
85See Large Foreign Partners to Get 15% of China Unicorn (visited Jan. 24, 2000)
<http:/wwv.chinaonline.com/topstroeis/000121/CO001 1906/asp>.
86 See China Unicorn Close to Settlement with Foreign Investors (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http:/vww.chinaonline.comftopstories/00033011/CO0032904.asp>.
17 See id.
88Unicom first settled its CCF ventures in the coastal provinces before moving to the
ones that were in-land. As of August 9, 2000 all the coastal CCF ventures had been finalized
while some of the non-coastal ones were not. Terms and conditions, however, have been set
for those settlements that have not been finalized yet. Follow-up Telephone Interview with
Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman, Welcom (Aug. 9, 2000). The interview lasted approxi-
mately 15 minutes. Mr. MacLellan gave an update of the situation as of August 9, 2000.
See also Matt Fomey & Jason Dean, China Unicorn Prepares for IPO by Ending Foreign-
Firm Ventures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A26.
'
9See Mark O'Neill, Unicom in Talks Over CCF Deals, S. China Morning Post Internet
Edition, Nov. 17, 1999, (visited Sept. 14, 2000) <http://vww.scmp.com/News/Bu...extasp_
ArticlelD-19991117013038618.asp>.
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the MII reiterated that the CCF projects were "irregular" and not only stated
that the issue of the CCF contracts was settled, but that it was not a WTO
issue.90 Furthermore, even in light of the agreement, Unicorn officials con-
tinued to state that it would be in the interest of the foreign investors to end
the use of irregular financing (from the CCF deals).91
The final settlement for the CCF ventures left some investors unhappy
and disgruntled.92 All the settlements were confidential, but it is most likely
that investors received their initial investment back plus interest.93 They did
not, however, receive any administrative costs or expenses back as part of
their settlement.94 In addition, some investors may have received an alloca-
tion of shares at the IPO or warrants to purchase shares in the future (not to
be triggered until 6 months after the date of the IPO).95 Once the settle-
ments were reached, the CCF ventures started the decommissioning proc-
ess, which was estimated to take between 90 and 120 days.96
In the aftermath of the situation, the question is: how did this happen?
The foreign investors went into China with a clear plan and investment
scheme that was approved by the relevant government authorities. These
joint ventures were all in the midst of being carried out with money having
exchanged hands and construction having started on various projects. Why
then did the government suddenly decide that these ventures were "irregu-
lar"? How did the foreign investors end up in such a quagmire? Will ac-
cession to the WTO stop situations like this from happening again?
V. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA
To answer some of the questions posed by the Unicorn situation, it is
necessary to look at the legal framework that underpins the foreign invest-
ment environment in China. China has learned, since it opened its doors in
1979, that one of the keys to attracting foreign investment is the develop-
ment of a legal system that is acceptable to Western investors.91 Statistics
indicate that they have been successful in attracting foreign investors. It is
questionable, however, whether the existing legal system can serve as a
9°See Christopher Parkes, Investors fight for "'Revised" Contracts, FIN. TIMES (visited
Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q2ddle6.htm>.
91See China Gains with WTO, FT Asia Intelligence Wire, Nov. 21, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus. Anal. & Country Info., and Selected Legal Texts
and Codes.
92See MacLellan Follow-up interview, supra note 88.
93 See id.; See also Forney & Dean, supra note 88.94 See MacLellan Follow-up interview, supra note 88.95See id.; See also Fomey & Dean, supra note 88.96The decommissioning process is basically a liquidation process. See MacLellan Fol-
low-up Interview, supra note 88.97 See Peter Howard Come, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Invest-
ment Regulation in China, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 247 (1995).
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solid framework on which China can continue to successfully attract for-
eign investment.
Many of the problems that foreign investors face in China stem directly
from the fact that the legal framework that guides foreign investment is
vague and weak. Why is that so even though it should be evident that one
of the keys to prosperity through foreign investment is a strong legal sys-
tem? It can be partially explained by the fact that China has only had a very
short period of time-20 years-to build up a legal system that is compati-
ble with their socialist market economy. The fact that the legal system is
relatively young, combined with the fact that the Chinese have a unique
conception of the meaning of the rule of law helps explain why their legal
system is so weak.
China's legal framework for foreign investment reflects a "tension
between encouraging foreign investment and maintaining state control over
the economy."98 The framework is regulatory in nature and puts a large
emphasis on state control of economic and social development.99 Tradi-
tional Chinese culture has also played a large role in shaping the meaning of
law and shaping how laws are enacted in China.
Confucian teaching has always influenced the development of Chinese
law.100 Confucianism favors seeking solutions by peaceful discussion
rather than by taking disputes outside the realm of the parties involved and
emphasizing the discord that is already existing.'01 In essence, anybody
who brings a conflict to court is viewed as having disturbed social tranquil-
ity and as being disruptive and uncultivated. 10 2 Therefore, the law has al-
ways been subordinate to virtue and Confucian principles of harmony,
peace, and conciliation. As a result, justice is not so much guided by the
law as it is guided by reason and an individual's virtue. As a result, from a
cultural standpoint, the rule of law is viewed in a different light in China
than it is in many Western countries.
China's economy is different from the Western capitalist economy that
most foreign investors are used to facing. These differences have influ-
enced the development of the foreign investment legal framework. An im-
portant point to note is that China is trying to build a socialist market
economy.'03 Though they have tried to move towards developing a capi-
98See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China Dilemmas
of State Control, in CHINA's LEGAL REFORMS 155 (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996).
99See id. at 156.





103 Along with socialist market economy terms like "socialist democracy" and "socialism
with Chinese characteristics" have also been used to describe the new China. See Pat K.
Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictabil-
ity, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 615, 634 (1994).
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talist economy by developing policies that allow markets to set prices and
determine the allocation of resources, that permit private ownership, and
that allow foreign investment and trade, the country still holds on to its
Communist roots.'04 China is a one party state, a "people's democratic
dictatorship," which some people say is a country ruled by men and not by
law.105 All the reforms and laws reflect the socialist influence of the Chi-
nese Communist Party.
In addition to understanding the philosophical underpinnings of law in
China, it is also important to look at how laws governing foreign investment
are enacted. The development of the legal framework for foreign invest-
ment did not start until 1979. China's legal system and formal legal insti-
tutions were practically destroyed when their economic contact with the
outside world was cut off between 1966 and 1976.106 Only with the adop-
tion of the open door policy in 1979 did the Chinese start to rebuild their le-
gal system.
The highest legal authority in China is its Constitution, which was en-
acted in 1982.107 Laws are enacted by the National People's Congress
(hereinafter "NPC") and its various standing committees.0 8  The State
Council, ministries, and administrative agencies also issue regulations,
rules, provisions or measures, decisions, resolutions, notices, and orders to
refine the legislative purposes of the NPC or its standing committees.'
0 9
Access to published Chinese legislation is difficult as there are no offi-
cially published gazettes or compilations of Chinese laws and regulations
that are updated regularly. 10 Moreover, internal rules that are applicable
may not be publicly disclosed."' Judicial decisions are not considered
precedents and therefore, are not considered sources of law.'12 As Chinese
laws and regulations can come from many different sources, and as they are
not often published, it is difficult for foreigners to be knowledgeable of all
the laws and regulations that are applicable to them.
Once foreigners have jumped over the hurdle of finding out what laws
apply to them, they face another difficulty that is even harder to overcome.
Laws in China are inherently fluid and flexible. This is illustrated by the
'04See id.
'
0 5 See id.
06 See Moser, supra note 5, at 2.
107See Daniel A. Lapres, Christian Lamonin, & Liu Kefu, Introduction to the Chinese





10 See Moser, supra note 5, at 3.
"'See Daniel A. Lapres, Christian Lamonin, & Liu Kefu, Introduction to the Chinese
Business and Legal Environment, in BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA, supra note 105, at 19.
12 See id.
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characteristics of Chinese legal drafting that are employed in formulating
the law. Chinese laws are often filled with principle-like pronouncements,
vagueness and ambiguity, broadly worded discretions, undefined terms,
omissions, and general catchall phrases.1 3 These drafting techniques pro-
duce laws that are often subject to varied interpretations by different parties.
Instead of being a form of protection for foreign investors, these laws can
create risks that are built into the investment environment and hard to avoid.
In places where the rule of law is strong, such risks are minimized be-
cause the law is viewed as being absolute, as embodying a set of ethical
norms that are embraced by the society, and as being normative.1 4 Norma-
tive law serves as a clear guide for people's actions and behavior. 15 There
are three general principles that are reflected in laws that are normative:
certainty, generality, and equality 1 6 The certainty principle guarantees that
the law is stable and can not be manipulated by arbitrary power.117 The
generality principle guarantees that the law is not particularized to policies,
goals, or individuals.1 8 The equality principle guarantees that the law is
applied to everyone equally.11 9 These three elements provide protection
against the exercise of arbitrary power by private individuals as well as
government officials.
In China, however, there is a gap between the law on its face and the
legal norms that are actually implemented. Chinese law is not normative,
but instead is instrumentalist. 20 As a result, it is not characterized by the
fundamental characteristics of normative law, that is, certainty, generality,
and equality. Law in China is used as a vehicle to promulgate the policies
and goals of the state.121 It is state policy and not law that stands supreme.
Therefore, legislative enactments and laws do not represent norms that are
applied consistently in different situations, but instead represent ways to ex-
ercise state power. As goals and policies of the state change, so will the
interpretation of the law. Laws are intentionally left vague to provide room
for different interpretations that may apply at different times and by differ-
ent people. This characteristic of the law, along with the fact that so many
different state organs can enact laws and regulations, makes it hard to de-
termine exactly what laws are applicable and how those laws should be in-
terpreted.
113See Come, supra note 97, at 253.
14 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 500.
"SSee id. at 522.
1 6 See id.
"
7 See id.
1 8 See id.
119See id.
120See id.; see also PITMAN B. POTTER, FOREIGN BusINEss LAW IN CHINA - PAST
PROGRESS AND FuTuRE CHALLENGES 5 (1990).
121 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 522.
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As a result of this instrumentalist approach and the lack of normative
principles, the rule of law in China is often subordinated to the rule of the
individual. 122 The rule of law prevents arbitrary abuse of power by indi-
viduals and also protects enterprise and individual rights.2  But, in a place
where it is trumped by the rule of the individual and where law is subject to
interpretation by government officials who have to follow government poli-
cies and directives, an environment is created where there are autocratic and
unpredictable rules.124 Furthermore, frequent political infighting in China
often leads to policy inconsistencies that promote different interpretations
of the law.125 There is an increased fear of unpredictability in an environ-
ment that has multiple government agencies enacting laws and regulations
and where it is not uncommon for those agencies' political egos to clash.
The implementation of state policy through the use of law is illustrated
by the FECL. The FECL sets a legal foundation for legitimate state inter-
vention in almost all foreign business transactions. 26 One of the main prin-
ciples of the FECL is the protection of national sovereignty and social
welfare. 27 As a manifestation of this principle, the FECL codifies the re-
quirement of government approval for most contracts involving a foreign
party. 1 28 It sets out the processes by which the government will use to re-
view contract terms and the processes by which contracts are to be negoti-
ated.129 This guarantees that there is some degree of regulatory review by
the government before any contract is actually approved. The goal of the
review and approval process is to make sure that the projects comply with
the policies set out by the government. 30 Therefore, the law allows the
government to make sure that all foreign economic contracts conform with
state policy and goals.
Two articles in the FECL to pay special attention to are Articles 4 and
9 of Chapter 1. Together, they express the principle of sovereignty that is
embodied in the FECL.' 3 1 Article 4 states that "contracts must be made in
accordance with the law of the People's Republic of China and should not
be prejudicial to the public interests of society of the People's Republic of
122See Chew, supra note 103, at 637.
"2See id.
'
2 4 See id.
125 See id.
126 See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China Dilenunas
of State Control, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 98, at 168.
'
27 In addition to this principle, the FECL is based upon three other guiding principles,
equality and mutual benefit, primacy of international treaties to which China is a party, and
honoring contracts and maintaining good faith in business activities. See Zhang & McLean,
supra note 73, at 126.
128 See id.
12 9 See id.
13 0See id.
131See Lewis, supra note 3, at 510.
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China."'3 2 Article 9 states that "contracts that violate .... the public interest
of the People's Republic of China are invalid., 133 Foreign investors should
be wary of terms like "public interest." Such terms are never clearly de-
fined and can be used by the Chinese government to terminate agreements
or deny business licenses with no explanation.
1 34
VI. UNRAVELING THE UNICOM MYSTERY
Applying an understanding of the Chinese foreign investment legal
framework to the Unicorn case will help illuminate how the foreign inves-
tors got into this situation. Foreign investors that participated in the CCF
scheme with Unicorn, for the most part, took all the right steps to protect
themselves. The Unicorn quagmire was not caused by their actions. The
policy indeterminacy of the Chinese government and the inability of the le-
gal framework to protect investors from this indeterminacy were the main
causes of the situation.
Using the details of WelCom's (one of the U.S. CCF investors) CCF
ventures with Unicorn as an example, it is easy to see that the foreign in-
vestors tried to take steps to protect their investment. In forming the CCF
joint ventures, WelCom took all the necessary steps that were mandated by
the government to set up a joint venture.
To form a joint venture, the first step for a foreign party to take is to
find a Chinese partner and have that partner submit a letter of intent for ap-
proval to the proper Chinese office. 5 As relationships still continue to be
the heart of the Chinese contract process, it is important not only for foreign
investors to cultivate a good relationship with the government, but for them
to find a Chinese partner who has a good relationship with the govern-
ment.136 The Chinese company chosen must have the authority to negotiate
joint venture contracts.1 37 Though finding a Chinese partner with a good
relationship with the Chinese government may not guarantee success, it is
one step that the foreign investor can take to improve their chances of suc-
cess.
In WelCom's case, the investors probably could not have chosen a
partner that had a better relationship with the government or one that had




135 See Tanner, supra note 1, at 158.
136 See id.
137Not all Chinese companies have the authority to negotiate. To find out if a particular
company has such authority, foreign parties may ask to see a copy of the Chinese company's
license issued by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce or a copy of their arti-
cles and look for a clause indicating such authority. See id., at 159.
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venture contracts with Unicom.138 Their investment partners were both
highly respected Chinese state-owned enterprises: Chinese Railroad Tele-
communications Center, Ltd., the subsidiary company used to hold MOR's
ownership in Unicorn, and China Everbright Ltd.' 9 Choosing a state-
owned company as a joint venture partner was probably one of the safest
choices one could make because state-owned companies are controlled by
the State, and therefore should be familiar with State policies.
In addition to choosing a safe partner, WelCom should have been fur-
ther protected by the fact that Unicom itself put a clause into the joint ven-
ture contract stating that it had the right and authority to enter into such
contracts.1 40 WelCom's joint ventures, as well as all the other CCF ven-
tures, were not only duly approved by Unicorn, a State-owned company
whose high ranking executives were appointed by the State Council, but
also by China's foreign investment administration authorities.141 In addi-
tion, central government leaders personally attended the contract signing
ceremonies, indicating their tacit endorsement of these contracts. 
142
The joint ventures allowed WelCom to participate in the build-out of
230,000 network lines.143 By the time the Government declared the CCF
contracts "invalid," Welcom had already negotiated equipment contracts for
its joint ventures and a credit facility to underwrite a majority of the equip-
ment and operating costs of the joint ventures. 44 By May 20, 1999, they
had invested approximately US$22.8 million into their CCF joint ventures,
all of which had commenced commercial operations. 45 Before any joint
venture could be started, the FECL and JVL both dictate that MOFTEC has
to approve the contracts involved. With money already invested and the
commercial operations of the ventures already started, WelCom had no rea-
son to think that it did not have approval from the government to go for-
ward. Furthermore, the relevant authorities had not only allowed the
implementation of the CCF contracts with WelCom, but had allowed the
implementation of CCF contracts with the other 39 foreign investors. Uni-
com had also gotten approval from the State Administration of Foreign Ex-
change to use US$1.4 billion in foreign investment capital to purchase
telecommunications equipment and to build out various telecommunica-
138Memorandum from Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman of WelCom, to WelCom Share-
holders 2 (May 20, 1999) (Memorandum used with the permission of Douglas C. MacLel-
lan) (on file with the author).
139 See id.; see also MacLellan, supra note 45, at 4.
'40See MacLellan interviews, supra note 82.
141 See MacLellan, supra note 79, at 2.
142See id.
143See MacLellan, supra note 138, at 2.
'44See id.
145See id.
Investing in China's Telecommunications Market
20:509 (2000)
tions networks throughout China.14 6 Logic dictates that these contracts
would not have been approved in the first place if they had been illegal.
So what did the MU mean when, in 1998, it stated that CCF ventures
were "irregular" and must be "rectified"? The MI never stated that the
projects were "illegal." Their statements, however, implied that the CCF
structures should not exist because they were illegal.
Technically, though, the schemes were not illegal. The foreign inves-
tors were able to take advantage of a legal loophole in the system. The
government policy prohibited joint ventures that allow foreign management
and administration of post and telecommunications services. 147 It did not
prohibit a joint venture between a foreign investor and a Chinese company
that did not directly own and build telecommunications networks. Nor did
it prohibit a joint venture between a Chinese-based joint venture company
and Unicorn. In the case of the CCF ventures, the foreign investor did not
have direct control or ownership over the management or operations of the
telecommunications networks. Unicom's provincial branches retained all
the ownership and operation rights.148
The problem in this case was that the law prohibiting foreign invest-
ment in the telecommunications sector was broad enough so as to allow one
interpretation of the law by MOFTEC, which obviously allowed these in-
vestments in the beginning, and a completely opposite interpretation by the
MU, which later deemed these investments irregular.
Where the rule of law is weak and is mainly an instrument of the party,
the interpretation of the law can change. In this case, neither the law,
MOFTEC, nor the foreign investors' Chinese partner could protect and
guide the foreign investors because the rule of law was subordinated to the
rule of the individual. The gap between the normative reality of the law
(the actual letter of the law) and the actual implementation of the law was
evident. It did not matter what the law said, because two completely differ-
ent interpretations were derived from it by two different agencies at two dif-
ferent times.
In this particular case, the interpretation changed partly because of a
clash of political egos. The telecommunications industry is at the center of
a clash between the liberal forces of the government which favor market re-
form and the conservative forces which do not.149 Liberal forces won the
battle when the State Council created Unicom in order to liberalize this
sector of the economy in 1994. But the conservative forces, led by Wu
Jichuan, the head of MU, struck back by persuading the government that the
146 See MacLellan, supra note 79, at 2.
147See Catalogue, supra note 15.148See MacLellan, supra note 45, at 4.
149See Leslie Pappas, Telecom Tug-of-War, NEVSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1999, at 33.
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CCF schemes were only quasi-legal.' 50 This is not only an example of the
rule of the individual triumphing over the rule of law, but also an example
of how the instrumentalist approach taken by the Chinese in interpreting
law can be highly detrimental to foreign investors.
In the Unicom situation, the foreign investors had no protection from
the law. The legal safeguards that foreign investors put into their contracts
had little to no effect. Sometimes, foreign investors are blinded by the pos-
sibility of large profits and forget to adequately weigh the risks inherent in
this relatively young socialist market economy. This is especially the case
in markets like the telecommunications market because of the indetermi-
nacy of state policy towards this sector, the internal political struggle be-
tween liberal and conservatives in this sector, and the lack of a law
governing it.
Looking back, however, there are two additional precautions, one legal
and one economic, that the foreign investors could have taken to provide
some protection for their investment.151 The legal precaution they could
have taken was to insert an arbitration clause into their contract that re-
quired arbitration outside of China.15 2 Though all the contracts had arbitra-
tion clauses, the clauses called for arbitration within China. 5 3  Some
investors felt that they would not have gotten a fair arbitration in China.'
54
The economic precaution that the foreign investors could have taken was to
buy political risk insurance from an institution like the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank.-
5
China's foreign investment policies as well as its legal framework for
investment are relatively young. The combination of a vast state bureauc-
racy enacting laws and regulations and a Confucian tradition of de-
emphasizing the rule of law does not help the government build a legal
framework that is attractive and workable for foreign investors. The vastly
diametrical political forces within the Chinese Communist Party are also a
cause for concern for foreign investors because these forces often cripple
the existing weak legal framework.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE U.S.-CHINA WTO AGREEMENT AND CHINA'S
IMPENDING ACCESSION INTO THE WTO ON THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
The U.S.-China WTO Agreement and China's impending accession
into the WTO raises many questions about the future of China. Is China, a
socialist-democracy with its own brand of market capitalism, ready to carry
150 See id.
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out all of its promises to the WTO and further open up its markets, or will
resistance from conservative hard-liners cause continued uncertainty in the
foreign investment and trade arena? Many say that China is going to
change for the better and that WTO membership will bring China in line
with the rest of the world, forcing them to strengthen the rule of law and to
increase transparency for foreign investors.15 6 This would, in turn, increase
protection for foreign investors and help them avoid such situations as the
one with Unicom. But, this would mean that the Communist Party, which
has always seen itself as above the law, would have to give up some of its
sovereignty to the rules-based, supranational trade body and to individual
consumers and private companies. 1 7 Once in the WTO, China will be
subject to the WTO dispute resolution procedures and disgruntled investors
will not be slow in lobbying their respective governments to use the system
as an arena to air their grievances. To hypothesize about how the WTO will
change China, it would be useful to first look at China's compliance with
past international agreements.
With respect to the legal system in China, enforcement has always
been the area of most concern. 15 Earlier economic agreements have often
required extensive renegotiations after they have been signed but before
they were truly put into effect.15 9 Some people say that China's record of
compliance with international agreements is not very good, with the most
glaring examples being its record with the United Nations Treaty on Politi-
cal and Civil Rights and its record on intellectual property rights.
160
Based on a study of China's compliance with its recent obligations,
however, it appears that China's record, though mixed, is better than most
156 See China Opens Up, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 17. After the signing of the
agreement, U.S. President Bill Clinton was quoted as saying "Today, China embraces prin-
ciples of economic openness, innovation, and competition that will bolster China's economic
reforms and advance the rule of law." William J. McMahon, China-U.S. Reach WTO Deal
(visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.comiissues/wto/newsarchive/secure/1999/
november/c911152 1.asp>.
t57See China Opens Up, supra note 156, at 17.
t58See Steven Mufson, it WTO China Deal, Hard Part Starts Now, THE WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1999, at A6.
159For example, an agricultural agreement reached in April 1999 was a hostage to WTO
talks until the week before the U.S.-China WTO Agreement was signed. The official rea-
sons for the delay was that China had not yet come up with a suitable Chinese translation for
the document. See id.
163See The Rule of Law in China, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1999, at A30; Paul Eckert,
WTO a Great Leap Into Unknown for China (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.dailynews.
yahoo.com/h/nm/1 9991116/bs/wto_china_49.html>. Five years ago, the U.S Trade Repre-
sentative negotiated an agreement with China guaranteeing protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights in China. But that protection is arguably worse today. See Craig Smith,
China May Prove Difficult Despite WTO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at A22.
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detractors think.161 The record shows that China's compliance with sover-
eign treaties and agreements is better than its enforcement of commercial
agreements between private parties. 162 This is a very bad sign for foreign
investors. According to the study, China's score in the area of Private
Agreements is only poor to fair.1 63 The report states that the China Interna-
tional Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, which dominates ar-
bitration of foreign disputes in China, has, in the past, ignored evidence
presented by foreign parties and has favored Chinese parties.' 64 Further-
more, the report indicated that even if outcomes of venture capital disputes
are favorable judgements for foreign parties, they are often difficult to en-
force.165  So even though China has signed many bilateral WTO agree-
ments, it is possible that foreign investors may not get the protection that
they need. This spotted record does not indicate that there will be immedi-
ate smooth sailing for foreign investors after China's accession into the
WTO.
Though the WTO rules require governments to stand back and allow
businesses to decide whether they want to buy foreign or domestic goods
and services, China does not yet have the culture, habits, or legal institu-
tions needed to restrain its own officials from controlling or influencing
business deals.166  Chinese-style socialist market capitalism has always
dictated that commerce is a state responsibility and trading decisions, as
well as foreign investment ones, have been made based on central-planning
requirements." Some say that though the economic arena is changing in
China, politics and ideology have changed very little. 68 Thus, even if the
reformist sector of the Chinese government is willing to adhere to all the
WTO rules, it is questionable whether they will be able to control the pro-
tectionist behavior of countless officials and Communist Party leaders who
not only have their own agendas, but are not used to ceding power to oth-
ers.
16 9
16 1 The record is compiled by scholars at the Georgetown University Law Center and lists
compliance as either good, fair, or poor. See Daniel H. Rosen, China and the World Trade







166See Robert Herzstein, Is China Ready for the WTO's Rigors?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
1999, at A30.
16 7 See id.
168 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Riding Winds of Reform, Yet Mired in Orthodoxy, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A15.
169 See Herzstein, supra note 166. Some say that MOFTEC is isolated among the minis-
tries under the State Council, as most of the ministries are reserved on the WTO matter, if
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Although U.S. negotiators call the agreement "comprehensive," China
can still hamper foreign investment because under the agreement, foreign
investors still need government-issued licenses to do business. 170  Even
though markets may be opened by the WTO, foreign investors will still be
subject to many rules and regulations. As one Beijing-based lawyer noted,
"[At] the end of the day, they have a million ways to write rules to frustrate
an agreement. China will find itself in perpetual litigation in WTO dispute
panels. 171  Furthermore, though China has stated that it stands by the
pledges it made in the bilateral agreements, it has so far resisted demands
from WTO members to specify precisely how it will follow through with
many of its pledges. 172
Legal tribunals for impartial and speedy resolution of disputes with
Chinese authorities do not exist right now.173 If the WTO does become the
primary forum for enforcing China's compliance with the rules, there are
questions as to whether the WTO will be capable of handling the workload
of all the potential complaints to be filed against China.
74
The opening up of the telecommunications industry is a perfect exam-
ple of the uncertain days that lay ahead for foreign investors. Almost im-
mediately after the signing of the U.S.-China WTO Agreement, Wu Jichuan
stated that the agreement would not dramatically impact China's informa-
tion industry.175 This is a rather bizarre statement, considering the fact that
the agreement had opened up the telecommunications industry, an industry
that previously had, theoretically, been completely closed to foreign in-
vestment. Wu further stated that though China's telecommunications sector
would be open to foreign investment, China would not only continue to re-
inforce regulatory efforts in the telecommunications industry by carefully
examining the qualifications of all foreign investors, but would facilitate
orderly competition according to the relevant regulations. 176 Wu also said
WVTO: Neither Boon Nor Bane (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.comcomm
entaryanalysis/vtocom/currentnewvs/secure/c911l7wtogary.asp>. Municipalities and local
governments have previously resisted implementing initiatives, such as the recent value-
added tax, until a time that suited them. See Alejandro Reyes, Just A Start: The Long WTO
Negotiations Look Easy Compared to What Comes Next (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http:ll
-vwv.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/ 99/1126/coverl.html>.
170 See Charles Hutzler, China Faces New Enforced Rules (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http:
//dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/1 9991117/wl/china_breakingrules I.html>.
171 See id.
t72See WTO & China, FiN. TiMEs, Oct. 13, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News Group File.
173 See Herzstein, supra note 166.
'
74 See id.
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that just because foreign investors would be allowed to hold a certain per-
centage of share capital does not mean that they must reach that figure. 77
This is a clear indication that approvals for foreign investment will still be
done on a case by case basis.
The statements made by Wu are a cause for concern. In the past, min-
istries and agencies have provided any number of reasons to reject foreign
investment, including rejecting applications because they "are not in
China's interest., 178 Foreign investors certainly hope that accession to the
WTO will make China's policies more transparent and less arbitrary. But
with a spotty record of compliance with international agreements and pri-
vate contracts, politics and ideology slow to change, and a large bureauc-
racy filled with officials used to conforming the law to state policy, changes
will not happen quickly. On its face, China will comply with their WTO
promises because they have to. It is possible, however, for them to formu-
late regulations and rules that will frustrate the spirit of the agreements until
they are ideologically and politically ready to truly embrace all the WTO
rules and regulations. There are already plenty of examples of other WTO
countries that have skirted WTO regulations.179 If these countries have
done so in the past, so can China.
China, however, does appear to be making efforts to conform their
laws to WTO rules and regulations and to make their transition into the
WTO smoother. For example, in its new five-year plan for 2001-2005 as
well as its long-term goals for 2015, the MII stated that it will draft laws
and regulations that are in line with WTO market principles. 8 ° The MII
also stated that administrative statutes, including the Regulations on the
Administration of Foreign Investment in the Telecommunications Service
Sector and the Regulations on Computer Networks and Information Safety
Management, would be adopted to facilitate China's entry into the WTO.'
China has also set up a ministry-level mediation agency to ensure that all
177 See Wu Jichuan Optimistic for the Restructuring of China's telecom Industry (visited
Jan. 19, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/000 I 9/b200011425-SS.asp>.
178See Lester J. Gesteland, Internet Not Fully Open to Foreigners Under China WTO-
Experts (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/991117/c9111751 .a
sp>.
179Japan, a member of the WTO, agreed in the mid-1980's to remove codified trade bar-
riers and eliminate legal cartels. But this has made little difference in the ability of importers
to penetrate the Japanese economy because with Japan's informal governance structure, the
corporatist Japanese State could conduct business as if the codified legalities were still in
place. China too has an equally efficient informal governance structure, which they admin-
ister through the operations of the Communist Party. Therefore, China may continue to be
able to follow old state policies despite admission into the WTO. See Peter Brain, Chinese
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the promises made during negotiations concerning WTO membership are
met. 82 This agency is headed by a Vice-Premier and will coordinate rela-
tions on all sides, hear complaints from foreign businesses, and make sure
that all of China's promises are fulfilled.1
83
Even so, China's rule of law will not change overnight. The "people's
democratic dictatorship" that Mao set up is simply too strong to be disman-
tled right away. Laws like the FECL, which legitimize state intervention in
foreign business transactions, will still exist. Political infighting between
reformist liberals and conservatives will still exist. Things will not change
until the Communist Party is no longer above the law and an open and
transparent judiciary system has been put into place. It will take more than
WTO membership to change China's weak legal framework.
The WTO though, is definitely a step in the right direction. By signing
the agreement, China has shown that they are willing to consider changes
that will fundamentally alter the way they have done business in the past 50
years. These changes will not come easily, but China's further integration
into the global economy will enhance the ability of China's trading partners
to influence China's behavior.184  China's membership in the WTO will
also have the potential to change China's internal politics, lending support
to the liberal reformist officials who hopefully understand that there needs
to be legal, social, and political reform to support the economic reforms that
are being implemented. Not until China formally accedes to the WTO,
however, will it be possible to determine exactly how quickly the much
needed changes will take place.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Reflecting on the Unicorn CCF situation, it appears that the legal and
political risks associated with investing in China are outweighed by the
economic windfall that the Chinese market can provide for foreign inves-
tors. When Unicom went public in Hong Kong in the middle of June 2000
it became the largest IPO in Hong Kong's history.185 On its first day of
trading in the New York Stock Exchange, June 21, its shares rose 10%.186
'
12 See A Promise Made... China Sets up Ministry-Level Agency to Make Good on WTO
Vows, (visited Aug. 13, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/issueswto/currentnew/secure
/C00071306.asp>.
183 See id.
184See Mark W. Frazier and Peter M. Hansen, China's Accession To The WTO: A Candid
Appraisal From U.S. Industry (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.nbr.org/publications/bri
efing/frazierbansen99.index.html>.
185Unicom's IPO raised over US$4.92 billion. See China Unicom's IPO Rings Up $4.92
Billion, AsIAN WALL ST. J., June 19, 2000, at 14.
186See Lester J. Gesteland, China Unicorn IPO Exceeds Expectations, Closes at US$22,
(visited June 22, 2000) <http://vww.chinaonline.com/topstories/000621/1/cOO062153.asp>;
See also Ricardo Lachica, China Unicorn Gets Strong Welcome in First Session, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2000, at 2.
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Investors were apparently quite eager to purchase Unicorn shares even after
the CCF debacle, which clearly showed that investing in China is accompa-
nied by a plethora of legal and political risks. This eagerness can be attrib-
uted to the almost limitless growth potential for the Chinese
telecommunications market. Financial analysts say that this potential is
enough to outweigh any political or legal risks.187 It would, however, still
behoove smart investors to be well aware of the legal risks that exist in in-
vesting in China.
Investing in China has the potential to be a very lucrative venture.
Since China opened its economy in 1979, billions of dollars worth of for-
eign investment have been poured into the country. But images of dollar
signs have overshadowed some of the legal and political risks of investing
in a country with an economy and foreign investment legal structure that is
young and unpredictable.
Law in China is fundamentally instrumentalist and therefore is con-
trolled by state policy. This opens up the possibility for the state apparatus
to dictate how a law should be interpreted. The legal framework that has
been built up has been, at times, weak and ineffectual, creating an unpre-
dictable environment where investors are subject to many risks that are of-
ten unavoidable. The foreign investors in the Unicorn case were casualties
of this unpredictable environment. This case has also shown that the risks
of foreign investment are especially great in politically sensitive sectors of
the economy, like the telecommunications industry.
The beginning of this comment stated that the reason investors are
turning away from China is primarily because they are losing money, be-
cause of bureaucratic red tape, and because of the shifting regulatory envi-
ronment. These three issues must be resolved in order for China to revive
the level of foreign investment to its previous heights. With the Asian
economy turning around, revenues will start increasing. Therefore, to rein-
vigorate its economy and increase the amount of foreign investment, China
must start to strengthen its rule of law and must start providing a stronger
legal framework that shields foreign investors from the political whims of
the vast bureaucracy. But this will not be an easy task.
China's accession to the WTO will help them start to strengthen the
rule of law, but only if the Communist Party is truly willing to alter some of
the bedrock principles of their one party system. This will require not only
changes in their political system, but their ideological system and their ad-
ministrative bureaucracy also. China's rule of law will not be strengthened
overnight because the system is too entrenched in its old ways for changes
to happen quickly. But as time goes on, China will realize that political and
187 See Jessica Wohl, IPO View-China Unicorn Seen Climbing in Large Debut, (visited
June 20, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/reuters/China/06_18_2000.reutr-story-NI514
7923.html>.
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ideological change must come with the opening of its economy. The Chi-
nese will also realize that to become a true world power, China must
strengthen its rule of law. In addition, they will feel pressure from their
trading partners, foreign investors, and the WTO bureaucracy to change and
will have no choice but to start making their regulatory environment more
transparent and fair to their economic partners. When China starts doing
this, the rule of law will inevitably be strengthened.
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